The Sutlers Supreme
From Mobilisation to Evacuation
NAAFI and the Early War, 1939–1940
PART THREE
Series Navigation
This article forms Part Three of a series.
Return to
Part Two: Somewhere in France, 1939–1940
.
The Collapse of the Phoney War, 1939–1940
By the spring of 1940, the Expeditionary Force Institutes (EFI) had established an efficient system across the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in France. From bulk issue stores and mobile canteens to newspaper distribution and familiar home comforts, the EFI network had become part of daily life for the troops during the long months of the “Phoney War.”
That stability was not to last. On 10 May 1940, the German offensive in the west brought the quiet routine of the previous months to an abrupt end. Within days, the carefully constructed system that supported the BEF began to fracture under the pressure of rapid movement, disrupted communications, and the growing realisation that the campaign in France was taking a dangerous turn.
For the men of the EFI, the transition was immediate and personal. What had been a settled network of supply and service became, almost overnight, a journey of withdrawal. Some were drawn north with the retreating BEF toward Dunkirk, while others, cut off from that route, were carried into a wider and more uncertain movement across France toward the Atlantic coast.
The End of the Phoney War
In the early hours of the 10 May 1940, German forces launched a coordinated offensive in the west, advancing into the Low Countries and striking simultaneously at Holland and Belgium. For the British Expeditionary Force and its French allies, the period of waiting was over; within hours, long-prepared plans were set in motion.
In accordance with Allied strategy, the BEF moved forward into Belgium to meet the anticipated German advance. The movement was rapid and, at least initially, orderly, reflecting the expectation that the main battle would be fought along prepared lines further east. As ever, the EFI followed close behind, providing support to the troops as the army advanced.
The speed of this advance is illustrated by the experience of Lieutenant J. N. Henderson. Crossing into Belgium on 10 May, he appears to have been among the first EFI officers to accompany the troops. By the following day, 11 May, a canteen service had already been established in the Brussels area, providing tea, cigarettes, and small necessities to men who had only just entered an active theatre of operations.
For a brief moment, the transition from peace to war appeared almost seamless. The systems developed during the preceding months continued to function, and the EFI network adapted quickly to the forward movement. That sense of continuity, however, would prove short-lived.
The Breakthrough at Sedan
Events unfolding further south soon undermined the assumptions on which the Allied plan depended. The differing routes taken by EFI personnel in May 1940 stemmed from the rapid and unexpected German breakthrough in the Ardennes. While Allied planning had anticipated a repeat of the advance through Belgium seen in 1914, the main German thrust came further south, through terrain considered unsuitable for large armoured formations.
Between 13 and 15 May, German forces crossed the River Meuse at Sedan and forced a decisive rupture in the French defensive line. Once across, armoured units pushed rapidly westward into open country, encountering little organised resistance. Within days, they reached the Channel coast, severing the northern Allied armies from the rest of France.
For the BEF and those supporting it, including the EFI, this transformed the situation entirely. What had been a forward deployment into Belgium became a fighting withdrawal under increasing pressure, with lines of communication cut and routes dictated by events rather than planning.
The result was to divide EFI personnel into distinct streams of retreat. Those in the northern sector, centred on Arras, were drawn back toward the Channel ports and eventual evacuation at Dunkirk. Others, positioned further south around Reims, found themselves cut off from that route and carried instead into a wider withdrawal across France toward the Atlantic ports.
German advance through northern France, May 1940. The breakthrough at Sedan and subsequent drive to the Channel divided Allied forces, leaving EFI headquarters at Arras (blue) drawn toward the Channel ports, while those at Reims (red) were carried south toward the Atlantic.
The Road to Dunkirk
Within days of the advance into Belgium, the situation changed with alarming speed. Around 13 May, German forces broke through the Allied line between Namur and Sedan. Exploiting the gap, armoured units drove rapidly westward before turning north toward the Channel, cutting behind the advancing British and French armies.
For the BEF, the effect was to sever its lines of communication with the base ports. Nine British divisions, together with supporting units, found themselves increasingly isolated in northern France and Belgium. What had begun as an advance now became a withdrawal under pressure, dictated not by plan but by necessity.
On 16 May, orders were issued for a general withdrawal. By 18 May, the BEF had taken up positions along the line of the River Escaut, facing east but with their backs increasingly toward the Channel. The direction of movement was now unmistakable.
For the EFI, the consequences were immediate and formidable. Across the forward area, some 3,000 personnel and approximately 200 vehicles now had to be withdrawn at short notice, alongside the disposal or evacuation of stocks held in more than 300 establishments. What had been a functioning support network only days before was suddenly required to contract, move, and in many cases abandon its resources under rapidly deteriorating conditions.
The roads to the rear quickly became congested. Military traffic mixed with columns of civilian refugees, all moving away from the advancing German forces. Progress was slow, uncertain, and frequently interrupted. In these conditions, the orderly routines of the preceding months gave way to urgency and improvisation.
Clear instructions were issued to EFI units to guide their actions in the confusion: “men, money, account books, and stock were to be saved in that sequence.” The order was both practical and revealing, reflecting the priorities of an organisation attempting to preserve its personnel and essential functions while accepting that much would inevitably be lost.
“Windfall” — Stock on the Road
The Sunday Sun (Newcastle), 20 October 1957.
The instruction given to EFI units during the withdrawal — that men, money, account books, and stock were to be saved in that order — reflected a practical reality. While personnel and essential records could be moved, the large quantities of stock held in canteens and depots often could not. Much of it was therefore abandoned or, where possible, distributed.
Contemporary and later accounts suggest that this loss was not always unwelcome. One describes troops encountering an EFI vehicle which had been bombed and could not be moved. Its contents, including cigarettes, were freely taken by passing soldiers, providing a brief moment of relief amid the strain of withdrawal.
RAOC Gazette.
In another recollection, an EFI lorry abandoned near Hazebrouck was said to have been left “just outside” the town, its stock helping to supply troops moving toward the beaches. Such moments, though small in themselves, offer a glimpse of how EFI resources, even when lost to the organisation, continued to serve the men during the final stages of the retreat.
On the Road
The experience of withdrawal for EFI personnel is perhaps best understood through individual accounts. One such example, recorded in a later press recollection, describes the journey of three EFI privates ordered to evacuate their premises at Arras in the early days of the retreat.
Having loaded what stocks they could, the men initially moved away from the advancing German forces, only to return briefly to “tidy up” before the enemy arrived. Their next objective was the coast. At one stage they succeeded in boarding a train already crowded with troops, on which they spent four days under almost continuous air attack before eventually reaching St Omer.
From there, the journey continued toward Dunkirk. Progress was slow and hazardous. Near Bourbourg, they encountered the effects of the German advance at close quarters, moving through areas threatened by ambush and linking up with a small detachment of British troops tasked with holding a stretch of road against armoured attack.
Conditions were marked by confusion and uncertainty. Roads were congested with military vehicles and civilian refugees, while movement was frequently disrupted by bombing and machine-gun attacks from the air. In such circumstances, the orderly routines of the EFI could no longer be maintained, and survival, rather than service, became the immediate priority.
%20British%20troops%20line%20up%20on%20the%20beach%20at%20Dunkirk%20to%20await%20evacuation..jpg)
Despite this, the three men eventually reached the coast and secured passage across the Channel, arriving safely in England after what was, for them, a remarkable journey. Their experience offers a small but telling insight into the wider movement of EFI personnel along the roads to Dunkirk in May 1940.
Evacuation and Aftermath
The withdrawal of the BEF toward the Channel ports culminated in a series of evacuations carried out under increasingly difficult conditions. From Dunkirk and the smaller ports to the west, including Boulogne, troops were taken off in large numbers, often under fire and with little certainty as to the outcome. For those who reached the coast, embarkation offered a route home; for others, the opportunity did not come in time.
By 3 June 1940, the main evacuation from the Channel ports had been completed. In its wake lay not only abandoned equipment and vehicles, but also the remnants of the extensive support network that had sustained the BEF in France. For the EFI, this meant the effective loss of hundreds of canteens and depots, together with the stocks they had held only weeks earlier in anticipation of a very different campaign.
Yet even in retreat, EFI personnel continued to operate where circumstances allowed — moving with the troops, providing what services they could, and ensuring that remaining supplies were put to immediate use. Their experience during these final weeks reflects both the scale of the collapse and the effort to maintain some degree of normality amid rapidly changing conditions.
Not all EFI personnel, however, were carried toward Dunkirk. Further south, beyond the narrowing perimeter, others were drawn into a different line of withdrawal — one that would lead away from the Channel and toward the Atlantic ports.
Southward — The Road to St Nazaire
Liverpool Echo, 4 April 1960.
Not all EFI personnel were drawn toward Dunkirk. Further south, beyond the narrowing perimeter of the BEF’s withdrawal, others found themselves moving in a very different direction. Among them was Second Lieutenant Petit of the RASC/EFI, whose experience provides a clear example of the route taken by those cut off from the Channel ports.
At EFI headquarters in the Reims area, the changing situation was quickly felt. As German forces advanced and communications broke down, the orderly structure of the preceding months gave way to the immediate necessity of withdrawal. Petit was tasked with returning to Bouzy, on the Arras front, to locate a senior non-commissioned officer and bring him back to safety—an indication of the increasingly fragmented nature of events.
What followed was not a single, continuous movement, but a series of journeys shaped by circumstance. Progress took place in stages, often under difficult conditions, and against the background of advancing German forces and disrupted routes. Like many others in the southern sector, Petit and those with him were no longer moving toward a fixed objective, but adapting their course as events unfolded.
In contrast to the northward pull toward Dunkirk, this was a wider and more uncertain withdrawal, carrying EFI personnel deeper into France and, ultimately, toward the Atlantic ports. It was along this route that Petit’s journey would continue, forming part of the lesser-known southern evacuation that paralleled the more familiar events on the Channel coast.
The Story of Lt Petit’s RASC/EFI Retreat
Once it became clear that the German advance toward the Channel ports would cut off the bulk of the BEF from the rest of France, the position of the Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF) became untenable. For EFI headquarters and establishments at the airfields in and around Reims, the time had come to withdraw.
At a conference on 14 May, it was decided that the withdrawal would take place in two phases. Phase One saw all aircraft at air stations north of Reims relocated to airfields in the Orléans area. Phase Two involved the movement of ground staff, including all EFI personnel. It was at this point that Lieutenant Petit’s journey began.
The first problem was what to do with the large quantities of NAAFI stock held in the various establishments. Petit’s initial task was to find alternative premises. Accompanied by Lieutenant Wren, an EFI Works officer, he set out toward Orléans. Eventually, they identified a disused windmill at Sauvage, between Anglure and Romilly, and succeeded in arranging a lease with the owner.
A temporary warehouse was quickly established, with additional canvas structures erected alongside it, and soon began to fill with supplies. On 16 May, following a visit from Major Hart, Petit received orders to return north to the town of Bouzy. The town had been evacuated, but the EFI staff there had refused to abandon their stock.
The journey was fraught with uncertainty. Enemy units were known to be in the area and had already passed through the town. With a driver, Petit set out for Bouzy. On arrival, the town appeared deserted, and the canteen was found locked.
Knocking loudly, Petit called out, “Open up — we’re EFI!”
After a moment, the door was cautiously opened by a burly EFI sergeant and his three assistants. The sergeant explained that when the RAF evacuated the village, the EFI staff had removed the NAAFI sign and barricaded themselves inside. In the hours that followed, they had watched German forces pass through and had been convinced that an attempt would be made to break in.
Preparing to defend themselves, they had surrounded their position with packing cases, stacking rows of canned goods on top.
With some dry humour, Petit remarked, “Bombarding them with tins of tomato soup, I take it.”
The sergeant replied, somewhat sheepishly, “No, sir — we were out of tomato. We’d have had to use the Mulligatawny.”
The lorry was then loaded with the canteen supplies and staff, and the party made their way safely back to Sauvage. This episode marked only the beginning of a much longer and more uncertain journey.
Lieutenant Petit and the Road to St Nazaire
For EFI units supporting the Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF) in the Reims area, the German breakthrough in mid-May 1940 created a rapidly deteriorating situation...
Petit’s recollections, recorded in a series of post-war accounts...
EFI personnel to Dunkirk
2nd Lt Peter Petit to St Nazaire
Petit's sub-journey / reversal
13 June 1940 — Withdrawal Ordered
Late on the evening of 13 June, orders were received that the AASF would withdraw towards an unspecified destination on the western coast. For EFI personnel, this immediately raised practical difficulties. Vehicles were scattered, many away from headquarters, and the need to move at short notice conflicted with the task of regrouping both men and transport.
Captain Hart, commanding the EFI detachment, refused to abandon his personnel. Only once the unit had been reassembled did the convoy begin to move. Even then, the position was precarious. Instructions indicated that the bridges over the river Loire were to be demolished at a fixed time, requiring all traffic to cross at least thirty minutes beforehand. With routes already congested, the margin for error was dangerously small.
Denied access to the southern crossings, the convoy instead moved along the north bank of the Loire. Contact with the AASF was soon lost, and after a roadside conference it was decided to make for Nantes — a decision taken in uncertainty, but one that would shape the remainder of the journey.
14 June 1940 — Arrival at Nantes
The journey to Nantes was marked by the now-familiar scenes of the 1940 retreat: congested roads, exhausted refugees, and a growing sense of dislocation. During this stage, Petit encountered a striking reminder of the upheaval — a former brewery proprietor who had once supplied large quantities of beer to the NAAFI, now reduced to a destitute refugee by looting and violence. The contrast left a deep impression.
Fuel shortages became critical as the convoy approached the city. By resorting to the expedient of “PPR” — pinch, pay or requisition — sufficient petrol was obtained to reach Nantes on the evening of 14 June. There, Major Lynn-Smith, the senior NAAFI transport officer, directed the unit to a château outside the city serving as a temporary EFI headquarters.
The situation they encountered was bleak. Both NAAFI and Army warehouses had been abandoned, and stocks salvaged from earlier withdrawals, including those from Reims, were effectively lost. Even more striking was the knowledge that fresh supplies from the United Kingdom had only recently been landed — now destined to fall into enemy hands or be dispersed.
15 June 1940 — The Château at Nantes
The unit spent the night of 14–15 June in the grounds of the château, sleeping in their vehicles and expecting at any moment to be ordered onward. The uncertainty of their position was matched by the continued responsibility for safeguarding EFI funds. One sergeant, in charge of a mobile canteen, entrusted Petit with a substantial sum — some 30,000 francs — which the subaltern carried on his person after issuing a receipt.
Such episodes underline a key aspect of EFI operations during the retreat. Even as organised supply chains collapsed, the organisation remained accountable for significant financial and material resources. The duty to protect these assets persisted alongside the immediate concern of evacuation.
16 June 1940 — Montoir and the Coastal Assembly Areas
Orders to move were issued at first light on 16 June. Joining a vast and disordered flow of military traffic heading west, the EFI convoy made for the coastal assembly areas. At Savenay, Movement Control attempted to divert them inland to await further instructions, but this order was firmly rejected. Having spent weeks withdrawing under pressure, there was little appetite for retracing their steps into uncertainty.
Instead, the unit proceeded to Montoir, where the scale of the evacuation effort became clear. Thousands of troops and vehicles were gathered in makeshift staging areas, with limited coordination and rapidly deteriorating conditions. Units were frequently redirected, often on foot, and information was inconsistent.
Despite the confusion, EFI personnel continued to fulfil their welfare role. Improvised feeding arrangements were organised, including large communal meals from whatever supplies could be gathered. In one instance, assorted rations — corned beef, beans, potatoes and other items — were combined into a single mass meal to ensure that all received at least some sustenance.
The presence of significant quantities of NAAFI stock created additional challenges. With the risk of looting and the impossibility of organised evacuation, difficult decisions had to be made. Stocks of spirits were destroyed on the spot to prevent disorder, while lighter wines were distributed among nearby units. Efforts were made, however, to preserve account books, cash, and higher-value goods.
That evening, a small party succeeded in loading selected stores, funds and personnel aboard a French collier bound for the United Kingdom — a rare instance of success amid the general chaos. For many others, however, no such opportunity existed.
17 June 1940 — The March to St Nazaire
During the night of 16–17 June, orders were received for the remaining personnel to proceed immediately to St Nazaire. With transport severely restricted, much of the journey had to be undertaken on foot. For EFI personnel — many of whom were older than typical front-line troops — this proved an exhausting ordeal after days of continuous movement.
A single lorry, retained in defiance of orders, carried emergency rations and collected those who fell out along the route. Even so, men collapsed from exhaustion along the roadside, and only through determined effort were they brought forward.
By dawn on 17 June, the unit reached the port area. The scene that greeted them was one of profound disorganisation. Thousands of troops crowded the approaches, many without rations or clear direction. In these conditions, EFI personnel once again reverted to their core function, establishing improvised tea points and distributing what supplies remained.
%20British%20troops%20and%20trucks%20waiting%20to%20be%20evacuated%20from%20St%20Nazaire,%20June%201940.jpg)
Imperial War Museums (HU 47951).
Unbeknown to them, events were already unfolding offshore that would overshadow all that had gone before. For the moment, however, their task remained unchanged: to provide what support they could in whatever circumstances they found themselves.
By the morning of 17 June, the long withdrawal from the interior of France had come to an end at St Nazaire. For the men of the EFI, the immediate concern remained to organise, supply, and support those around them. Yet beyond the crowded quays and anchorage, events were already unfolding that would soon give this port a tragic place in the story of the campaign.
Sources & References
Images
Natkiel, Richard. Atlas of World War II (1985). Map illustrating the German breakthrough in May 1940.
Imperial War Museums. “British troops pass a burning vehicle during the retreat to Dunkirk” (HU 104611). Accessed via Wikimedia Commons. Public domain.
The Sunday Sun (Newcastle), 20 October 1957. “Windfall” press cutting. Accessed via Findmypast (British Library Newspapers). Reproduced under fair dealing for non-commercial historical research and commentary.
Chandler, “Pompey.” “Ten Years After.” RAOC Gazette, August 1950.
Imperial War Museums. “British troops awaiting embarkation at Dunkirk” (NYP 68075). Accessed via Wikimedia Commons. Public domain.
Bond, Geoffrey. “In Retreat.” Liverpool Echo, 4 April 1960. Press cutting. Accessed via Findmypast (British Library Newspapers). Reproduced under fair dealing for non-commercial historical research and commentary.
Imperial War Museums. “British troops and vehicles waiting for evacuation from St Nazaire” (HU 47951). Accessed via Wikimedia Commons. Public domain.
Literature
Cole, Lt.-Col. Howard N. NAAFI in Uniform (1982).
Bond, Geoffrey. “Lancastria” series of articles. Liverpool Echo and Evening Express, 4–9 April 1960. Accessed via Findmypast (British Library Newspapers). Reproduced under fair dealing for non-commercial historical research and commentary.
No comments:
Post a Comment